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Abstract 
 
Two studies compared choice and underlying cognitive processes in equivalent decision tasks 
involving risk and uncertainty (lotteries versus sports gambles including displayed expert 
probability judgments). In sports gambles, background knowledge was triggered via 
information on team location, home or away. Otherwise, displayed risk information (stake, 
winnings, odds and outcome probabilities) was controlled across gamble type. In a choice 
study, home win bets were chosen significantly more frequently than draws or away wins, 
compared to lottery equivalents. In a parallel study eliciting concurrent verbal protocols, 
participants made fewer evaluations of odds and probabilities, and more statements involving 
background knowledge in sports gambles. Furthermore, some sports gamble protocols 
indicated modifications of stated probabilities and decision strategies contingent on domain 
knowledge. It was concluded that stated probability revision and knowledge-based reasoning 
are key cognitive processes in sports gambling not normally applied in the lottery paradigms 
often employed in decision research.  
 
 
KEY WORDS: Decision making, risk, uncertainty, probability revision, decision 
strategy, knowledge-based reasoning 
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 Cognitive Processes Underlying Lottery and Sports Gambling Decisions:  
The Role of Stated Probabilities and Background Knowledge 
 
A basic distinction is made in decision research between risk and uncertainty 
(Tversky & Fox, 1995). Risky decisions are those made when objective outcome probabilities 
are precisely known. In contrast, decisions under uncertainty are those made when outcome 
probabilities are unknown and any estimates or beliefs about them are subjective. In 
behavioural studies of risky decision making, research participants have traditionally been 
presented with lotteries in which small sums of money can be won or lost. These outcomes 
are determined by a clearly random process, for example, drawing lottery tickets from an 
opaque container or spinning a fair “wheel of fortune”.  Known proportions of the tickets, or 
of the wheel, are associated with different outcomes to clearly define their probabilities of 
occurrence. The value of the lottery paradigm has frequently been stated, perhaps most 
clearly by Lopes (1983, p. 137): “The simple static lottery or gamble is as indispensable to 
research on risk as is the fruitfly to genetics”. However, its limitations as the main empirical 
domain of psychological decision theory have also been recognised (e.g. Goldstein & Weber, 
1995; Huber, 1997, in press). In particular, since there are major differences between 
experimental lottery contexts and those involving uncertainty in everyday life, lottery-based 
findings and theories developed from them may have limited generalisibility.  
The present studies assess the extent to which findings from lottery studies generalise 
by comparing predecision processes and choice patterns in a lottery paradigm with those in a 
similar context involving uncertainty. We constructed naturalistic gambling tasks involving 
uncertainty, based on betting on a football match, and equivalent, experimental lotteries 
(raffles) in which the information displayed was closely matched. As far as we know, there 
are no previous studies of differences in decision processes across decision under risk and 
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uncertainty that have controlled displayed risk dimension information. The studies focus on 
two important differences between these decision contexts, the nature of outcome 
probabilities, and background information and knowledge. In one study we adopt a process 
tracing approach which seeks to identify the cognitive mechanisms underlying decision 
behaviour. Previous research in this vein has shown how predecision processes are contingent 
on a range of features of the decision context, such as task complexity and similarity structure 
(for reviews see Crozier & Ranyard, 1997; Payne, 1982; Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993; 
Svenson, 1979, 1996, 2003). For example, with respect to decision under risk, process tracing 
studies using the think aloud method have identified some of the editing heuristics and 
decision strategies people apply to lottery decisions (e.g. Montgomery, 1977; Ranyard, 1987, 
1995). The broad aim of the present studies is to extend this work to develop an 
understanding of the cognitive processes underlying decision under uncertainty. 
Research questions and hypotheses 
First let us consider how differences in the nature of outcome probabilities may affect 
decision processes. There is an extensive body of previous research on the effects of 
ambiguous and unknown outcome probabilities (Camerer & Weber, 1992; Fox, 1999; Fox & 
Tversky, 1995, 1998; Heath & Tversky, 1991; Keren & Gerritsen, 1999; Tversky & Fox, 
1995). Some of this has compared decision behaviour between situations where known 
outcome probabilities are stated with those where outcome probabilities are neither known 
nor stated – what Hogarth and Kunreuther (1995) refer to as “decision under ignorance”.  
Equally important, however, is an understanding of the role of stated probabilities of different 
types in different contexts. Whereas in the lottery paradigm stated probabilities can be 
interpreted as precise, known probabilities, those in the sports gambling context can only be 
interpreted as expressions of subjective probability. Little is known about the impact of 
different types of stated probability on the decision process. However, a priori it is possible 
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that the lottery’s clearly defined probabilities would have a greater impact than subjective 
opinions offered to the sports gambler, even if the latter are those of an expert in the domain. 
If people believe that the validity of probability information in the sports context is more 
doubtful, they may attach less importance to it. Consequently, they may prefer sports gambles 
with better possible gains, rather than better probabilities of gains, compared to in equivalent 
lottery scenarios.  In Study 1, therefore, one specific hypothesis tested was: 
H1: lottery decisions will be more risk-averse compared to the equivalent sports 
gambling choices. 
The second contextual difference between lottery and sports gambling we consider 
concerns background information and knowledge. The traditional lottery paradigm is not a 
knowledge-rich context, unlike the world of sports gambling and many other everyday 
decision contexts in which an extensive knowledge base is available. This may affect both the 
subjective probabilities and decision strategies used to make gambling choices. With respect 
to the former, Windschitl and Weber (1999) found that interpretations of precise stated 
probabilities were influenced by the background context. For example, in scenarios where an 
outcome was a priori more likely, verbal likelihood judgements were higher than in those 
where it was less likely, even though experts’ stated probabilities were the same. The present 
studies extend this research to decision under uncertainty and investigate the extent to which 
the context of a sporting event affects gambling choices in scenarios where expert stated 
probabilities are presented which take the context into account. Specifically, a second 
hypothesis tested in Study 1 was that team location information would influence gambles on 
the outcome of a football match. We predicted that choices would reveal a home win bias: 
H2: Home win bets will be chosen more frequently than draws or away wins, 
compared to the equivalent lottery options, even though stated probabilities were 
the same across both contexts. 
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Finally, background information and knowledge may also trigger different decision 
strategies in sports gambling compared to lotteries. Previous process tracing studies have 
found that most decision strategies adopted for lottery choices are compensatory, involving 
trade-offs across gambles on the main risk dimensions, i.e., monetary gains and losses and 
their associated probabilities (Montgomery, 1977; Ranyard, 1987, 1995). Studies of decision 
under uncertainty, however, have identified a wider range of strategies employed. Three 
studies are particularly relevant. First, Hogarth and Kunreuther (1995) compared decision 
behaviour in conditions where precise stated probabilities were displayed to that in situations 
where it was not presented at all. They reported that people selected more trade-off 
arguments to justify their decision in the precise condition, and more ‘meta-strategy’ 
arguments, ones not dependent on risk dimensions, in the ignorance condition. Second, Huber 
and Kühberger (1996) used the think aloud method to compare predecision processes and 
mental representations in a lottery and three non-lottery tasks involving uncertainty. In two of 
the non-lottery tasks, precise probabilities were stated for the possible outcomes but in the 
third task they were not. Verbal protocols revealed that in the non-lottery tasks, people 
introduced more background information and knowledge than they did in the lottery task. In 
addition, differences were found in the frequency with which outcome probabilities were 
evaluated. This was least in the non-lottery task in which outcome probabilities were not 
presented, and most in the gamble task. Turning to the third study, Lipshitz and Strauss 
(1997) found that participants used two types of strategy in making naturalistic decisions 
involving uncertainty. One type involved assumption-based, or knowledge-based, reasoning 
and the other compensatory evaluation. 
In view of the above evidence, therefore, Study 2 was designed to explore decision 
strategies in the lottery and sports gambling contexts and to identify ways they differed across 
contexts. In particular, this process tracing study posed two questions:  
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1. To what extent might knowledge-based decision strategies be applied in the sports 
gamble context? 
2. Do stated probabilities have the same role in strategies across lottery and sports 
gambling contexts? 
Although we expected to find evidence of knowledge-based strategies in the sports gambling 
context, we did not at this stage predict how this would lead to differences in decision 
behaviour. As well as exploring strategy differences, Study 2 aimed to seek evidence of the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying the choice patterns observed in Study 1. To summarise, 
then, in the next section we present Study 1 , a choice study testing two hypotheses predicting 
differences in decision behaviour across gambling domains, and in the subsequent section, we 
report Study 2, the parallel process tracing study incorporating the think-aloud method 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Payne, 1994). 
 
Study 1 
Method 
Decision tasks and materials. The sports gambling context we used is typical of the 
kinds of gambling opportunities available nowadays in the UK and other countries. Consider 
the following football betting options available from UK bookmakers, based on an actual 
match in the English Premier League (summarised in Table 1). The bookmaker offered fixed 
odds on the three possible outcomes of the match as shown in the table. The odds define the 
payoff-to-stake ratio for each outcome. For example, if someone decides to stake £2.00 on a 
win for the home team (Aston Villa) the bookmaker would pay out £1.00 plus the return of 
the stake if the home team won, otherwise the stake would be lost. Similarly, the payoff for a 
£2.00 bet on a drawn match would be £6.00 and that for the same stake bet on the away win 
(Bolton Wanderers) would be £8.00. 
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------------ Table 1 in here ------------ 
 The odds can also be interpreted as the bookmaker’s estimates of the likelihood ratio 
of each outcome occurring or not. (It should be noted that since this is fixed-odds betting, the 
bookmaker decides the odds before offering the bet, usually about 48 hours before the match 
is played). As likelihood ratios, the odds in the example correspond to the outcome 
probabilities shown in Table 1. Since there are only three outcomes, assuming the match is 
neither postponed nor abandoned, the outcome probabilities should sum to 1.00. However, 
they actually sum to 1.12, presumably to generate the bookmaker’s expected profit on the 
transaction. The normalised probabilities shown in the right hand column of the table, 
obtained by dividing the original estimates by 1.12, give more accurate (and coherent) 
estimates of outcome probability. In the present studies, participants were presented with 
these latter estimates, described as the opinions of experts, which we refer to as normalised 
stated probabilities (NSPs). Note however, that in the naturalistic betting context only the 
match odds are normally displayed.  
Figure 1 gives an example of the display format used in our studies for sports betting 
tasks. This format was used because equivalent laboratory lottery tasks, based on drawing a 
numbered ticket at random, can be constructed from it. As shown, background information 
was introduced by indicating which teams were playing at home or away. The lottery 
equivalent to our sports betting example is illustrated in Figure 2. In this lottery, the player 
must pick a ticket at random from a set numbered 1 to 100. They can choose from three 
alternative lotteries: whether or not the ticket chosen will fall in Band A, in Band B or in 
Band C. The instructions emphasised that for the lottery task the probabilities of winning 
could be calculated exactly from the number of tickets in the draw, whereas for the football 
task they were based upon experts’ predictions. Displayed information and other aspects of 
real-world knowledge were controlled as far as possible. For example, the names of the teams 
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involved in the football matches were not presented. The payoffs, odds and stated 
probabilities (expressed as percentages) were exactly the same as in the sports betting 
equivalent (Figure 1). The main differences, then, were in the gambling context, i.e. decision 
under risk versus decision under uncertainty, and the presence of information on which teams 
are playing at home or away in the sports context.  
----------- Figures 1 and 2 in here ----------- 
Design and materials. A repeated measures design was used with type of gamble, 
lottery versus football, being the main independent variable. We systematically varied the 
stated probabilities of sports outcomes (NSPs) by selecting a set of actual football match 
gambles varying in their pattern of odds. This information varied independently of team 
location, home or away. Thus, seven pairs of equivalent gambles were constructed for the 
main trials: odds, payoffs and expected values being exactly the same within each football – 
raffle pair. They progressed smoothly from a pair in which the Home Win / Band A was the 
strong favourite, through to a pair where the odds for a Home Win (or Band A) and an Away 
Win (or Band C) were exactly the same, and then to three further trials where the odds for the 
away team (or Band C) became increasingly shorter (see Appendix A). The basic dependent 
variable was the choice made. 
Participants were presented with two booklets, one containing the football trials and the 
other containing the raffle trials. So as to avoid order effects, counterbalancing was adopted 
whereby half the participants were presented with the booklet containing the raffle trials first 
and the other half were given the booklets in the opposite order. Also, for each type of 
gamble there were two booklet versions, each having trials in the reverse order of the other. 
Furthermore, the ordering within football and raffle booklets differed so that participants 
were not presented with gambles in the same sequence for the two types. 
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Participants. Thirty six female and 36 male adults participated, mainly students, both 
young and mature (mean age = 32 years, SD = 11 years). In order to motivate genuine 
consideration of choices, participants were paid £5 but had to use £2 of their fee as a stake on 
their choice of gamble on a trial selected randomly at the end of the session. 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually. The general nature of the study was 
explained and participants read the detailed instructions. After resolution of any problems, 
two practice trials were presented, one football and one non-equivalent raffle, and 
participants made their choices. Envelopes were then produced and it was explained that each 
one contained the outcome of either a real football match corresponding to the football 
gamble, or an actual play of the lottery. In order to stress that payment would be determined 
by real outcomes, the outcomes of the two practice trials were revealed and participants were 
informed of how much money they would have won or lost if either choice had determined 
their payment. Participants then worked through the first booklet of main trials at their own 
pace, circling their choices on a response sheet. They were then allowed a brief rest before 
completing the second booklet. Finally, participants were asked to choose at random one 
envelope from a set of envelopes containing the gamble outcomes of the choices they had 
made, and they were paid accordingly. The maximum amount that could be won was £15, 
with the minimum payable being £3.  
Results 
The proportions of choices made for equivalent football and raffle gambles are shown 
in Appendix A. The first analysis tested H1, the hypothesis that lottery choices would be 
more risk-averse than sports gamble choices. A measure of risk aversion (RA) was devised, 
based on the NSP of the chosen alternative. A choice of the riskiest option, with the lowest 
probability of winning (NSP) was assigned a score –1; a choice of the most likely outcome, 
with the highest NSP, was assigned a score +1; a choice of the alternative with the middle 
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NSP was assigned a score of zero. Then, for each participant, the mean RA averaged across 
all trials of each type of gamble was calculated. Positive scores indicate a tendency to avoid 
riskier alternatives, whereas negative scores indicate a risk-seeking tendency. In fact, contrary 
to the hypothesis, the mean RA score indicated a slight risk-seeking tendency for lottery bets 
(-.032) whereas for football bets the tendency was slightly risk-averse (.043). Given this 
result, inferential analysis was not performed for this hypothesis. 
The second analysis tested H2, the Home Win bias hypothesis. The appendix shows 
that for all seven gamble pairs participants chose the Home Win more often than they chose 
the equivalent lottery option, Band A. To test the significance of this result, a 2 x 2 analysis 
of variance was carried out. The first factor was order of presentation (football to raffle, 
versus raffle to football gambles) and the second was gambling context (football or raffle). 
The dependent variable was the mean proportion of Home Win or Band A choices for each 
trial pair, with a log transformation applied. The non-transformed means for this analysis are 
shown in Table 2. A significant main effect for trial type confirmed the presence of a Home 
Win bias (F1,6  = 23.00, p < .01) with an effect size (η2) for the non-transformed data of 0.80. 
The main effect of order of presentation was not significant (F1,6 = 0.36, p >.05, η2 for non-
transformed data = 0.05) and neither was the interaction between trial type and order of 
presentation (F1,6 = 1.57, p >.05, η2 for non-transformed data = 0.17). 
 Thus, as Table 2 shows, irrespective of order of presentation, participants were 
considerably more likely to choose the Home Win on football trials than Band A on raffle 
trials. A further test of the Home Win bias was carried out at the level of the individual. A 
two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test showed that the difference between the median 
number of Home Win and Band A choices made by each respondent across all trials was 
significant (z = 3.35, p < .0005). 
------- Table 2 in here -------- 
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Discussion 
The basic task our participants were set was to choose one of three win-lose gambles 
which had equal, slightly negative, expected values. Our first hypothesis (H1), that the nature 
of stated probabilities would cause lottery choices to be more risk-averse, was not supported. 
In fact, the difference in risk-seeking across gambling contexts was in the opposite direction. 
However, as predicted, for our second hypothesis (H2) we found a Home Win bias. Thus, 
changing the context from lottery to sports gambling, and adding information as to whether a 
team was playing at home or away, did have a significant effect on gambling choices. 
Having obtained clear evidence of the Home Win bias in sports gamble choices, the 
next step in our research strategy was to obtain verbal protocol evidence of the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying this pattern of choices. Specifically, a probability revision 
mechanism might operate in the uncertain sports gambling context, whereby the stated 
outcome probabilities are integrated with background information and knowledge to produce 
revised judged probabilities. Such a mechanism may not be triggered, however, if people 
assume that the expert has taken all relevant information into account and that the stated 
probability is the best estimate available. The first aim of Study 2, then, was to seek evidence 
for a probability revision mechanism in think aloud protocols. As stated earlier, the second 
aim was to describe the decision strategies in the lottery and sports gambling contexts and to 
identify ways they might differ across contexts.  
 
Study 2 
This study, carried out several months after Study 1, was intended to be parallel to 
that study in its essential features. This enabled us to test for the reactivity of the think aloud 
method by comparing the choice patterns in the two studies with respect to the Home Win 
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bias. We decided to use a representative subset of participants from Study 1 in order to ensure 
that individual strategy preferences underlying that study’s findings were represented. Apart 
from the changes described below, the materials, design and procedure were the same as 
those adopted in Study 1. 
Method 
Design and materials. Because protocol elicitation involved a longer procedure, the 
number of trials was half that of the previous study. With only six trials, if the same repeated-
measures design had been used participants would probably have recognised that odds and 
payoffs were the same across pairs of football and raffle trials. Therefore, an independent 
groups design was adopted with type of gamble being the main independent variable. Two 
matched sets of six trials were prepared each containing three football and three raffle trials 
(Sets X and Y, see Appendix B).  In two pairs the Home Win and Band A were the favourite, 
in another two the Home and Away Wins and Bands A and C were equal favourites, and in 
the remaining pairs the Away Win and Band C were the favourite. 
Participants were divided into two groups, and were randomly allocated either Set X 
or Set Y gambles.  Although, as before, one dependent variable was the gamble chosen, the 
main point of this study was to elicit and analyse verbal protocols. This had two components, 
a pre-decision think aloud protocol and a post-decision summary. In the present article only 
the think aloud protocols are relevant. The post-decision summaries were included as part of 
a methodological evaluation of alternative verbal report elicitation techniques which is the 
subject of a separate report. 
Counterbalancing was implemented to mitigate order effects, with half the 
participants in each group being given football trials first and half raffle trials first. Trial order 
was also counterbalanced within subgroups and trial types. In order to enable the reactivity of 
providing a post-decision summary to be tested, half the participants provided post-decision 
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summaries after each trial and half did not. Testing for reactivity was important because if 
providing a post-decision summary influenced the think aloud data, the value of the latter 
would be compromised. The instruction sheet was broadly the same as that used in Study 1 
apart from the addition of standard instructions to think aloud while completing the tasks 
(Svenson, 1989). 
Participants. A representative sample of 18 male and 18 female respondents (mainly 
students), who had participated in either Study 1 or a similar pilot study, was recruited (mean 
age = 40.5 years, SD = 15.33 years). 
Procedure. Participants were first given a brief oral introduction and then a more 
detailed written instruction sheet. Once any questions were answered, two practice trials were 
presented which included thinking aloud. For alternate participants a post-decision summary 
was elicited after each trial by the instruction: “Can you say in your own words how you 
made your decision?” As in Study 1, participants were paid according to the result of a 
randomly drawn trial. 
Coding schemes for verbal protocols. Two content analyses of the verbal protocols 
were carried out. For the main analysis, each pre-decision verbal protocol was transcribed 
and segmented into separate statements. The secondary analysis was at the level of the whole 
protocol (see below). The coding scheme for the statement level analysis was developed 
through an iterative process. The initial scheme was based upon a priori notions of categories 
that would be expected in the data. The two authors independently coded a set of protocols, 
discussed areas of agreement and disagreement and revised the initial categories. A further 
round of coding and consultation resulted in minor adjustments to produce the final scheme. 
The authors then independently coded the protocols of six participants not previously used. 
The Cohen’s Kappa of .88 for these codings signified a good level of agreement and so one 
of the authors coded the remaining statements.  
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The statement analysis used 12 categories in five groups. The main group comprised 
evaluative statements, either odds-based, referring to odds or probabilities, money-based, 
referring to payoffs, or other evaluative statements. Odds-based and money-based statements 
were further split into absolute and comparative categories. The former were evaluations of a 
single aspect of a gamble, e.g. “The money is good” and use of evaluative terms such as 
“only” when referring to payoffs or probabilities. The latter were statements comparing 
payoffs or probabilities across gambles, including judgements of similarity or difference. The 
other evaluations were split into: within-gamble comparisons of payoffs or probabilities, e.g. 
“The money in A is good, but the chance of winning it is poor”; overall comparative, where 
payoffs, odds and percentages were not referred to explicitly, or were referred to 
simultaneously when comparing gambles; and overall absolute evaluations of gambles (e.g. 
“this gamble is good”). The second group of categories consisted of knowledge-based 
statements, split into: knowledge shared across society, including general knowledge of 
football and randomness of raffles; and personal knowledge particular to an individual (e.g. 
“13 is my lucky number”). The third broad category was that of unclear statements, i.e. those 
where it was not readily apparent what the participant meant, incoherent and ambiguous 
utterances, or not falling into any of the other categories. The final two categories were 
recorded but not analysed further: statements where gamble information was read verbatim 
and those expressing a decision. 
The second analysis, based on the whole protocol, attempted to identify the major 
type of processing that could be said to have influenced the decision. In situations where 
there was ambiguity as to the category to which a protocol should be assigned, the coding 
which most clearly and directly determined the decision was applied. After a number of 
refinements, a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.64 was obtained for the relationship between the codings 
of the two authors. In order to report the main findings concisely, our presentation of the 
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protocol-level analysis is limited to a qualitative report illustrating the main decision 
strategies identified. 
Results 
The Home Win bias observed in Study 1 was also found in Study 2. In four of the six 
trial pairs a greater proportion of participants opted for Home Win choices on football trials 
than opted for equivalent Band A choices on raffle trials. The mean proportion of Home Win 
choices was 0.41 compared to 0.29 of Band A choices in the lottery trials. A one-tailed 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test showed that the difference between the median number of Home 
Win and Band A choices made by each respondent across all trials was significant (z = 1.70, 
p < .05). This confirms that the think aloud method was not reactive with respect to the main 
finding of Study 1. Also, the reactivity of the post-decision elicitation procedure was tested. 
Since there was no evidence of reactivity, that is, no differences on various process measures 
between the group providing post decision summaries and the group not providing them, data 
from the two groups was pooled. 
The final coding of the statement-level coding is summarised in Table 3. About one 
third were unclear or unclassified, but of the more meaningful utterances, most were 
evaluations of some kind, with evaluations of odds and percentage chances of winning (odds-
based in the table) accounting for about 30% of statements. Evaluations of winning payoffs 
(money-based) accounted for a further 16%.  As Table 3 shows, frequencies of most types of 
utterance were similar across gamble type, but there were some differences across context, in 
particular, rather fewer evaluations of odds and percentages and more shared knowledge 
statements on the football trials. 
---------- Table 3 in here -------- 
The role of the main risk dimensions, payoffs and stated probabilities. In order to 
assess whether the incidence of odds-based evaluations differed significantly across gamble 
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context, the mean number of such utterances per person was calculated for each context. The 
median number of these statements was greater on raffle than on football trials (0.50 versus 
0.33) and a one-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test showed that this difference was 
significant (z = 1.64, p < .05). A similar analysis for the mean number of money-based 
evaluations showed a slightly greater number on raffle than on football trials (median values 
0.25 versus 0.17), although a one-tailed Wilcoxon test found that the difference was not 
significant (z = 0.69, p > .05). This indicates that outcome probabilities were evaluated less 
frequently in decision under uncertainty compared to decision under risk. 
 The protocol-level coding was used to illustrate the decision strategies identified and 
to elucidate the function of different types of statement in them. Almost half the decisions 
made were classified as being based only on the main risk dimensions, as illustrated for both 
gamble contexts in Table 4. Some were dominated by the evaluation of stated probabilities 
and odds, some were money-based, and others were compensatory strategies involving both 
risk dimensions. It can be seen that the decision strategies illustrated are rather similar across 
gamble context. 
-------------- Table 4 in here -------------- 
The role of background knowledge. Table 3 shows that there was more processing of 
shared knowledge in the football gambling decisions. Approximately 47% (17) of 
participants made at least one shared knowledge statement on football trials compared to 
about 17% (6) on raffle trials. A Wilcoxon test showed that for those participants making 
such statements, this difference was significant (z = 3.40, p < .01, one-tailed).  For football 
gambles a post hoc analysis identified two sub-categories of statement, each produced by 11 
participants: (a) Explicit indications of Home Win bias; and (b) General football knowledge. 
Examples of protocols classified in the Home Win Bias category, that is, those in which such 
statements played a major role in the decision, are shown at the top of Table 5. The first two 
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illustrates that when the Home Win and the Away Win were equiprobable, knowledge of the 
importance of team location was sometimes used in a tie-breaking capacity. In contrast, the 
third protocol in Table 5 shows that knowledge of home team advantage was also used when 
the away team was the favourite. This is direct evidence of the operation of a probability 
revision mechanism: some participants used team location information to revise the stated 
outcome probabilities.  
Some statements in the second sub-category, General football knowledge, indicated 
possible changes in evaluation strategy across gamble type. Examples of protocols using 
team strength notions are shown at the bottom of Table 5. 
--------------Table 5 in here ----------- 
A second major type of knowledge contained in protocols was personal knowledge. 
Such statements were less frequent than shared knowledge, with only 17% of the participants 
making at least one such utterance on raffle trials and 11% on football trials. In all, these 
utterances were observed on around 5% of the football and 8% of the lottery protocols. They 
indicate that gamble information is sometimes restructured and related to the personal world, 
and is not simply encoded in the manner presented. 
 
General Discussion 
Relatively complex choice tasks with the same basic structure as typical everyday 
gambles involving risk and uncertainty were employed in these studies. Our experimental 
manipulations removed most background information but included stated probabilities in 
order to explore important questions concerning differences in decision processes across 
gambling contexts. In Study 1, our main finding with respect to decision behaviour was that 
home win bets were chosen significantly more frequently than draw or away win gambles, 
compared to lottery equivalents. In Study 2, we replicated this result and sought verbal 
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protocol evidence of cognitive mechanisms underlying this choice pattern. The validity of 
such data has been established in a range of tasks and has proved useful in elucidating the 
processes underlying decisions in many domains, including decision under risk (Biggs, 
Rosman & Sergenian, 1993; Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, Hults & Doherty, 1989; Harte, 
Westenberg & van Someren, 1994; Montgomery, 1977; Ranyard, 1987). We found that 
evaluations of the main risk dimensions (monetary payoffs, odds and probabilities) 
dominated verbal protocols in both gamble contexts. Nevertheless, in sports gambles, 
participants made fewer evaluations of odds and probabilities, and more statements involving 
shared knowledge. We interpret our findings in terms of mechanisms of stated probability 
revision and knowledge-based strategies that can be triggered in decision under uncertainty 
but are not available in the traditional lottery paradigm used to investigate decision under 
risk. 
With respect to probability revision, several participants in the process tracing study 
explicitly referred to the greater likelihood of a Home Win or to the home team advantage in 
sports events. Stated probabilities (NSPs) can be integrated with this knowledge to produce 
the revised probabilities used in evaluation. A related line of research by Windschitl and 
Weber (1999) has shown that in other tasks precise probability information interacts with 
background information to influence probability judgment. It seems likely that the integration 
of stated probabilities and background information is ubiquitous in important real life 
decisions under uncertainty. People seem to readily modify the expert probabilities presented 
to them even though these experts will have taken into account the information that people 
use in these modifications. 
Turning to evidence relevant to the role of knowledge-based strategies, the protocols 
revealed evidence of such strategies specific to the sports gamble domain. Rather than 
thinking only in terms of the main risk dimensions, some respondents used the available 
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information to infer or judge the relative strengths of the home and away teams. Decision 
strategies were indicated such as simply gambling on the stronger team, or, if they were 
judged to be of similar strength, betting on a draw. Obviously, relative team strength and win-
probability are correlated, but this kind of knowledge-based thinking is qualitatively different 
from the compensatory thinking balancing probabilities and outcome values implied by risk 
dimension models such as prospect theory.  
Clearly, however, as well as differences in decision strategy, there was also much 
similarity across the two gambling contexts. In both cases, evaluations of the main risk 
dimensions dominated and compensatory decision strategies were prominent. Huber and 
Huber (2003) suggest that gambling is construed differently to many non-gambling tasks 
involving risk and uncertainty. In their study, participants requested probability information 
more in a lottery task because they expected to get useful information they saw as relevant to 
their decision. Our data shows that in sports gambling also people see probability information 
as important. The small difference we observed in the number of explicit probability 
evaluations may have been because the outcome probabilities in the sports gambles were ill 
defined compared to the raffle context. To investigate this interpretation further, future 
research could manipulate this property of probabilities more extensively while controlling 
other background information. 
Returning to the question of strategies, Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) found, in their 
study of naturalistic decisions involving uncertainty, that participants used two types of 
decision strategy. One type involved assumption-based, or knowledge-based, reasoning and 
the other compensatory evaluation. Our analysis of verbal protocols suggests that the use of 
such qualitatively different types of thinking may be context dependent. While gambling of 
all forms may be dominated by compensatory evaluation of risk dimensions, the domain of 
sport is more susceptible to knowledge-based reasoning. 
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In conclusion, Huber (1997, in press) and others have questioned the extent to which 
findings from the lottery paradigm generalise to everyday decision problems involving 
uncertainty. We conclude that the main reason lottery research may not generalise to such 
decision tasks is that the lottery paradigm does not provide decision makers with the 
opportunity to invoke their background knowledge, whereas most real world decision 
domains do.  For example, if the team names had been given in our sports gambling tasks this 
would, for a follower of English professional football, have triggered an extensive body of 
knowledge that would influence probability judgments and evaluation strategies. Huber 
argued that decision making across a range of more naturalistic risk contexts needs to be 
examined empirically, to augment the traditional focus on lottery gambling. Studies of the 
influence of stated probabilities in different knowledge-rich contexts, including those in 
which the credibility of stated probabilities is in doubt, would be a particularly promising 
direction for future research. 
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Appendix A 
Study 1: Stated Odds, Normalised Stated Probabilities (NSP) and 
Choice Proportions for the Seven Pairs of Gambles 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Gamble pair  Stated odds  NSP                             Proportion of Choices 
         ____________________ 
Football Raffle 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 Pair 1 
  HW / A  4/9   .62   .38  .28                           
  D / B   13/5   .25   .38  .40 
  AW / C  6/1   .13   .25  .32 
 
 Pair 2 
 HW / A  6/5   .41   .46  .36 
 D / B   9/4   .27   .19  .26 
 AW / C  9/5   .32   .35  .38 
 
Pair 3 
 HW / A  6/4   .36   .29  .28 
 D / B   2/1   .30   .43  .46 
 AW / C  13/8   .34   .28  .26 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
continued .... 
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Appendix A continued: 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Gamble pair  Stated odds  NSP                             Proportion of Choices 
         ____________________ 
Football Raffle 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Pair 4 
 HW / A  6/4   .36   .43  .25  
 D / B   11/5   .28   .40  .44 
 AW / C  6/4   .36   .17  .31 
 
Pair 5 
 HW / A  13/8   .34   .43  .32 
 D / B   11/5   .28   .29  .36 
 AW / C  11/8   .38   .28  .32 
 
Pair 6 
 HW / A  15/8   .31   .31  .22 
 D / B   11/5   .28   .26  .38 
 AW / C  6/5   .41   .43  .40 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
continued .... 
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Appendix A continued 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Gamble pair  Stated odds  NSP                             Proportion of Choices 
         ___________________ 
Football Raffle 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 Pair 7 
 HW / A  5/1   .15   .35  .28 
 D / B   9/4   .28   .31  .36 
 AW / C  4/7   .57   .35  .36 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. HW/A = Home Win or Band A, D/B = Draw or Band B; AW/C = Away Win or Band 
C. 
Some triads of proportions do not sum to one because of rounding. 
 
Lottery and Sports Gamble Choices 30 
Appendix B 
Study 2: Stated Odds and Normalised Probabilities (NSPs) for the Six Pairs of Gambles 
____________________________________________________________ 
Gamble pair      Stated odds       NSP 
____________________________________________________________ 
  1  HW / A 11/10 .42 
    D / B 11/5 .28 
    AW / C 2/1 .30 
 
   2  HW / A 5/3 .34 
     D / B 11/6 .32 
     AW / C 5/3 .34 
 
   3  HW / A 7/4 .33 
     D / B 2/1 .30 
     AW / C 13/9 .37 
 
   4  HW / A 5/4 .40  
     D / B 9/4 .28 
     AW / C 7/4 .32 
____________________________________________________________ 
continued ......... 
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Appendix B continued 
____________________________________________________________ 
Gamble pair      Stated odds       NSP 
____________________________________________________________  
   5  HW / A 7/5 .37 
    D / B 5/2 .26 
    AW / C 7/5 .37 
 
   6  HW / A 13/8 .33 
     D / B 2/1 .29 
     AW / C 5/4 .38 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. Set X: football trials pairs 1, 2, 3; raffle trials pairs 4, 5, 6; Set Y: football trials pairs 4, 
5, 6; raffle trials pairs 1, 2, 3. 
HW / A = Home Win or Band A, D / B = Draw or Band B; AW / C = Away Win or Band C. 
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Table 1 
Odds offered by a bookmaker on outcomes of an English Premier League football match, 
associated probabilities and normalised stated probabilities (NSP) 
 
______________________________________________ 
Aston Villa (home) versus Bolton Wanderers (away) 
______________________________________________ 
Outcome Odds  Associated    NSP 
    probability 
______________________________________________ 
Home Win  1-2       .67     .60 
Draw   3-1       .25     .22 
Away Win  4-1       .20     .18 
______________________________________________ 
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Table 2 
Study 1: Mean choice proportions of the Home Win and equivalent Band A gamble, by 
gambling context and presentation order 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Order of presentation 
    ___________________________________________ 
First    Second 
 
       Gambling context Football      Raffle                     Football       Raffle 
____________________________________________________________________  
       Mean      .39          .28        .36  .29                      
       SD      .08          .06        .08  .05 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 
Study 2, statement-level analysis: Definitions and percentages of statements in each main 
category by gambling context 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Category        Gamble context 
       _______________________________ 
       Football (n = 349) Raffle (n = 383) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Odds-based evaluations    
  Comparative       23.21   27.94 
  Absolute         4.30     2.61 
Money based evaluations    
  Comparative       11.75   12.01 
  Absolute         4.87     4.44 
Other evaluations    
  Within-gamble        1.72     2.61 
  Overall comparative        4.58     6.53 
  Overall absolute        1.43     0.52 
Knowledge-based 
 Shared        10.32     3.13 
 Personal          1.43     2.87 
Unclear or unclassified     36.39   37.34 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 
Study 2: Examples of protocols dominated by odds-based, money-based, or compensatory processing 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Odds based processing “Betting upon the outcome of a raffle again.  There’s slightly bigger difference in percentages here, …[Pause]… I 
think …[Pause]… I’m going to be … [Pause]… almost predictable and go for Band A, I’ll take sort of the middle 
band of chance, shall we say, percentage chances and go for that.” 
 
“home win, 13 to 8, draw 2 to 1, away win 5 to 4. Now I'm gonna have to do some quick mental arithmetic to find out 
how close 13 to 8 is to 5 to 4 …[Pause]… 13 to 8 is still the best odds …[Pause]…  Oh no it's not, 5 to 4’s better … 
[Pause]…  on an away win ... [Pause]… marginally …[Pause]… I’ll go for the away win.” 
 
Money based processing “The outcome of a raffle.  Band A ... [Pause]… Right now Band A is odds, and you get £1.50 for your £2 stake.  B 
would actually double it, and C. You'd only get 80p.  I'd go for B.  I'd be greedy.” 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
continued ...... 
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Table 4 continued 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
“Betting upon the outcome of a football match, the stake of £2 and the odds winning …[Pause]… a home win 
…[Pause]… the odds of  7 to 5 which means I could win £2.80 for my £2.  A draw is odds of 5 to 2, which means £5 
for my £2 stake.  And C, the away win, is £2.80.  Well, both the home and the away win are £2.80 win for a £2 stake... 
[Pause]… A draw of £5 compared to winning £2.80, I think, would make me go for B, the draw.  So that's B.” 
 
Compensatory processing “Betting upon the outcome of a raffle again.  Band A is 1 to 33, could win £3.25, 34 to 62 could win £4, 63 to 100, £ 
2.50.  Percentage chances at the bottom, 33 per cent, 29 per cent and 38 per cent.  There’s not a lot of difference 
between the percentages.  The higher percentage is C, so I mean for £2.50, the lowest ones £3.25.  Probably go for 
Band B, it’s nearly a third chance for £4”. 
 
“Home win 5 to 3, £3.33, draw 11 to 6, £3.67, away win same as A isn't it, 5 to 3.  So again, looking at percentage 
chances of winning ... [Pause]… I'm gonna go for B again, because it's only slightly less, the percentage chance of 
winning, but there's slightly more to win.  Okay, B.” 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Lottery and Sports Gamble Choices 37 
Table 5 
Study 2: Examples of protocols in the Home Win Bias and Football Knowledge categories 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Home Win Bias “Draw odds 5 to 2, 26% ... [Pause]… Home win odds 7 to 5, could win £2.80. And that's the same for the away win ... 
[Pause]… This time I'd like to go for the one with the highest percentage and the home win and the away win both have 
the same percentage but I think I'd go for the home win because there's more, there's more chance of them winning at 
home than away.” 
 
“The first one, oh, those are equal odds.  So.. I would go with A that time, cos they're equal odds, the home team is likely 
to have an advantage …[Pause]… with the same odds, the…[Pause]… the home team is likely to be more …[Pause]… the 
stronger team, being at home.” 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
continued ..... 
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Table 5 continued  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
“ that doesn't look too bad cos home wins tend to be the ones that are generally work out whatever the odds are, 7 to 4. B, 
draw odds of 2 to 1, so you win £4 and a 30% chance of that so there's not much difference there between those two. And 
C, an away win with odds of 13 to 9, which is quite a high ... [Pause]… you'd get £2.89 back. (pause) so 37% chance of an 
away win ... [Pause]… Right well I'm not sure which of these to go for now because I'll my instinct is to go for a home 
win which has a pretty good chance it's a 30% and it's not that much different than the away win which I reckon is, is not 
all that favourable so I will go for home win, because, the home win seems to me of the three, it hasn't got the highest 
chance of, highest estimated percentage chance but I think in real terms it's probably much more likely to be the outcome 
of the game. So I'll go for a home win.” 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
continued ..... 
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Table 5 continued  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Football Knowledge  “The percentages, 40% of a home win, draw 28%, an away win 32% ... [Pause]… They're a stronger team, there could be 
possibly be a stronger team at home, than, than away... [Pause]… the team that they play, the opponents ... [Pause]… of 
one team …[Pause]… two teams, home win, one play team playing at home stronger than playing away. Their away 
opponents …[Pause]… are quite good, draw, a draw's a possibility not good odds on the draw... [Pause]… There's a 
definite result… [Pause]… Without knowing the teams I think I would go for a home win.” 
 
“ I'm going for a …[Pause]… draw here, between two, between two teams, whoever they are, presumably ... [Pause]… 
great teams like Arsenal or Liverpool, who end up doing a boring …[Pause]… so called nil, nil draw.” 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Sports gamble presentation format. 
Figure 2. Lottery gamble presentation format. 
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BETTING UPON THE OUTCOME OF A FOOTBALL MATCH 
 
 
 
Given the information below, indicate your choice of gamble on the sheet provided. 
 
 
STAKE OF £2.00 
 
 
       ODDS AND WINNINGS: 
      _________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                                  
       A.                                   HOME WIN     ODDS  1/2 
 
YOU WOULD WIN £1.00 (+ YOUR £2.00 STAKE BACK) 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                            
       B.                                         DRAW    ODDS  3/1 
 
YOU WOULD WIN £6.00 (+ YOUR £2.00 STAKE BACK) 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                                  
       C.                                     AWAY WIN     ODDS  4/1 
 
YOU WOULD WIN £8.00 (+ YOUR £2.00 STAKE BACK) 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
 
      
 
    PERCENTAGE CHANCES: 
 
HOME WIN DRAW AWAY WIN 
60% 22% 18% 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Lottery and Sports Gamble Choices 42 
 
 
 
BETTING UPON THE OUTCOME OF A RAFFLE 
 
 
 
Given the information below, indicate your choice of gamble on the sheet provided. 
 
 
STAKE OF £2.00 
 
 
       ODDS AND WINNINGS: 
      _________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                                  
       Band A                  TICKET NUMBERS 1-60     ODDS  1/2 
 
YOU WOULD WIN £1.00 (+ YOUR £2.00 STAKE BACK) 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                                 
       Band B                  TICKET NUMBERS  61-82    ODDS  3/1 
 
YOU WOULD WIN £6.00 (+ YOUR £2.00 STAKE BACK) 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                                  
       Band C                  TICKET NUMBERS  83-100     ODDS  4/1 
 
YOU WOULD WIN £8.00 (+ YOUR £2.00 STAKE BACK) 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
 
      
 
    PERCENTAGE CHANCES: 
 
BAND A BAND B BAND C 
60% 22% 18% 
 
 
  
